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ABSTRACT
             
This paper uses earnings histories obtained from the Social Security Administration and
linked to the survey responses for participants in the Health and Retirement Study to investigate
redistribution under the current social security benefit formula.  We find that as advertised, at the
level of the individual respondent, the benefit formula is progressive.  When individuals are arrayed
by indexed lifetime earnings, own benefits are significantly redistributed from those with high
lifetime earnings to those with low lifetime earnings.  However, much of this apparent redistribution
is from men to women, and when examined at the level of the family, from primary to secondary
earners. When families are arrayed according the total lifetime earnings, and spouse and survivor
benefits are taken into account, the extent of redistribution from families with high lifetime earnings
to families with low lifetime earnings is roughly halved.  Much of the remaining redistribution is
from families where both spouses spend much of their potential work lives in the labor market, to
families where a spouse, often with high earnings potential, chooses to spend a significant number
of years outside of the labor force.  When families are arrayed by their earnings potential, that is
earnings during years when both spouses are engaged in substantial work, there is very little
redistribution from families with high to low earnings capacity. 
Accordingly, at least for families on the verge of retirement today, introducing a simple
system of privatized or other individual accounts, i.e., a system that ignored issues of redistribution,
would have no major effect on the distribution of social security benefits net of taxes among families
with different earnings capacities. Moreover, although privatized or other individual accounts would
reduce redistribution from two earner to one earner families, the extent of that redistribution is
greatly exaggerated when one compares benefits among individuals arrayed according to lifetime
earnings. 
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Department of Economics Department of Economics
Dartmouth College Texas Tech University
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and NBER Thomas.Steinmeier@TTU.edu
alan.l.gustman@dartmouth.edu1Spouse and survivor benefits almost always accrue to the woman in the household.  For
example, in 1998, there were 2.5 million women and 24,000 men who were dual beneficiaries receiving
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I.  Introduction.
This paper examines how a system with a progressive formula specified according to
individual earnings, supplemented by a policy designed to redistribute benefits from dual earner toward
single earner families, affects the distribution of benefits among families with different lifetime earnings
or earning capacities.  The conventional wisdom is that the social security benefit formula is highly
redistributive, favoring low over high earners.  It certainly is true that the structure of the benefit formula
is highly progressive, replacing, up to maximum covered earnings, a much higher share of earnings for
individuals with low than high earnings.  The focus on the individual may be misplaced, however. 
From a public policy perspective, the proper accounting unit for evaluating redistribution is the family.  
The distribution of family earnings will differ from the distribution of individual earnings. The
relation of the earnings distributions for individuals and for families will depend on the correlation of the
wage and labor supply for each spouse and between spouses. If wives have lower wages than
husbands, then we can expect less redistribution among families than among individuals, since some of
the redistribution at the individual level will be from husbands with greater lifetime earnings to their wives
with lower lifetime earnings.
 A second factor which mitigates the degree of redistribution is that in addition to benefits based
on own earnings, social security often pays additional spouse or survivor benefits to low earning
spouses.  The amount of these benefits depend on the earnings of the spouse, and are greater the
greater the difference between the lifetime earnings of the two spouses.1  The evidence suggests spousespouse benefits (Social Security Administration, 1999, Table 5.G3).  Similarly, 4.8 million women and
36,000 men received nondisabled widows’ or widowers’ benefits in 1998 (Social Security
Administration, Table 5.F8).
2In Gustman and Steinmeier (2000), we find that the social security benefit formula fosters
redistribution to immigrants, and provides the highest returns to immigrant families who have been in the
U.S. for ten years and who have high yearly earnings. Something similar is going on here among those
who qualify for social security benefits, allowing families with a member who has been in the labor force
for relatively few years to enjoy a higher benefit-tax ratio.
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and survivor benefits are larger in families with high earnings.  If husbands with high earnings are married
to spouses with considerably lower lifetime earnings, spouse and survivor benefits will be more
important in high income families.  This, in turn, implies that social security will foster less redistribution
among households than among individuals (Steuerle and Bakija, 1994).
Low lifetime earnings may arise because individuals have low wage rates, or because they work
few hours or years.  Families with similar earnings capacities can supply different amounts of labor over
their lifetimes, and the current policy effectively subsidizes families with a spouse who, although working
at least ten years to qualify for benefits, remains home for many years rather than working in the
market.2  To determine the extent to which families that supply less time to the labor market benefit
disproportionately under the current system, we will examine redistribution among families when they
are arrayed by their earnings capacities as well as by their realized lifetime earnings.
This paper documents the sources and characteristics of redistribution from these various
features of the social security benefit formula, and from the relation between individual and family
earnings.  The next section discusses the workings of the social security benefit calculation in more
detail, and Section III discusses the data used in the study.  The principal data source is social security
earnings records in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), and this is supplemented by the3Some lawmakers strongly advocate the payment of spouse and survivor benefits to encourage
one parent to remain at home with young children.  To equalize the treatment of one and two earner
households under social security, other lawmakers have proposed various plans that would split the
credit for earnings in any year evenly between both household members, while eliminating spouse and
survivor benefits.
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respondents’ reports of their work histories.  Section IV considers years of work and earnings in those
years for respondents falling into different lifetime earnings categories.  The lifetime earnings used is
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), the same measure as is used by the Social Security
Administration.  Especially in the low AIME categories, low lifetime earnings can arise either because
the respondent worked relatively few years or because annual earnings were low.  The next section
calculates redistribution measures for individual and for families, and groups the results according to
both individual lifetime earnings and family lifetime earnings.  Section VI considers what the
redistribution looks like when we group families according to a measure of the potential earnings that
the families could have earned if both spouses had worked most or all of their adult years.3
The calculations we will make are directly relevant to the debate about the effects of privatizing
some or all of the Social Security System.  It is often argued that privatization would undermine the
redistribution fostered by the progressive social security benefit formula.  
For example, in commenting on our analysis of outcomes under a particular proposal for a voluntary
privatization system (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1998), David Cutler (1998, p. 358) argues: 
“We typically think that giving people choice is optimal since people can decide what is
best for them.  Thus the economic bias is to believe that, if people want to opt out of
social security, they should be allowed to do so.  In the context of social security
privatization, however, this analysis is not right.  Allowing people to opt out of social
security to avoid adverse redistribution is not efficient; it just destroys what society was
trying to accomplish.  If rich people and two-worker families opt out of social security,4
for example, we will no longer be able to redistribute from rich to poor or from dual
earners to single earners.  One of the purposes of social security will have been
defeated.  This is a cost of privatization of which we must be aware.”
Our analysis will determine just how much redistribution the current system fosters.  This
information is required by policy makers to decide whether they are still happy with the redistribution
that is being fostered by a set of rules established many years ago, when the typical household had a
single earner.  The calculations will also provide a benchmark to help understand the effects of various
reforms.  Any large change in the system is going to require an accounting of winners and losers, which
in turn depends on the extent of redistribution under the current system. In addition, a major
determinant of whether, if given the choice, individuals would choose to participate in a system of
privatized or other individual social security accounts over the current system, or to vote for a privatized
system, is whether or not they benefit from redistribution under the current system. 
There are a number of new and related papers on social security redistribution which use
different data sets and focus on somewhat different calculations from those in our study.  Liebman
(1999), in a paper completed contemporaneously with our own, modifies data from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation, using cohorts born from 1925 to 1929 and 1945 to 1949.  As in
our paper, Liebman has available matched earnings records from the Social Security Administration. 
He creates a simulation model and uses the model to analyze redistribution due to social security, and to
project redistribution under the current social security rules and into the future, with life tables and tax
and benefit values for 2075.  Coronado, Fullerton and Glass (1999a and b) construct covered earnings
histories from PSID data, and construct a simulation model which they use to analyze the effects on the4To be included in the sample, Coronado, Fullerton and Glass require that the respondent
remain in the PSID sample for the entire period.  Although the effects of attrition bias are not clear, this
is a very selective sample since low earners and the divorced are more likely to be lost.  In contrast,
when social security earnings records are available for a representative sample as in the HRS, attrition
over the period is not an issue.  To be sure, selection bias in matching the social security records for
survey respondents is an issue.  However, studies to date do not show any important systematic
relationship between observables and the availability of a matched social security record in the HRS
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 1999; Haider and Solon, 1999; and Olson, forthcoming).
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distribution of benefits and taxes of various schemes to reform social security.4  One of their concerns is
with earnings capacity, so they focus on benefit and tax distribution by total family potential lifetime
income.  While potential lifetime income is computed on the assumption that both spouses work full
time throughout their potential work lives, benefits and taxes are computed from the earnings histories in
the PSID data and projections are based on the actual work histories.  Feldstein and Liebman (1999)
use the data for the 1925 to 1929 birth cohort from SIPP, the same data as in Liebman (1999), to
analyze redistribution under proposed privatization reforms.
II.  A Conceptual Framework.
A.  How the Social Security Benefit Formula Works.
For each individual, the Social Security Administration calculates a measure of lifetime earnings
which is an average of the high 35 years of earnings, with zeros used if the individual has not worked 35
years.  A progressive benefit formula is then applied so that those who have low computed lifetime
earnings have a higher benefits, relative to earnings, than do those with high earnings. Specifically, the
formula for 2000 specifies benefits that are 90 percent of the first $6,372 of annual earnings, 32 percent
of the next $32,052, and 15 percent of remaining earnings.  The earnings measure is typically expressed5The exact payments to each spouse also depend on when the benefits are claimed.  These
rules are described in The Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin.  
6There are exceptions when a spouse was employed in a job not covered by social security, in
particular as a state and local government worker who did not contribute to the system.  There also are
other exceptions governing the benefits of individuals who have pensions from uncovered employment.
The Social Security System also provides benefits to the disabled and to surviving minor children.  This
paper is concerned with old age and survivors benefits, and does not address the issue of the
distribution of disability or other benefits than retirement, spouse an survivor benefits.
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as a monthly amount, the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), and the benefit amount is called
the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA).  By applying a progressive benefit formula to each individual’s
own AIME, benefits are redistributed to those individuals with low covered earnings over their lifetimes. 
Benefits to spouses and survivors affect the relationship between benefits and earnings, both at
the level of the individual and at the level of the family.  Spouses are entitled to roughly half of their
partner’s benefits, and survivors are entitled to an amount roughly equal to the benefits that would have
been payable to the deceased spouse.5  Divorced individuals can collect benefits as though they were
still married as long as the marriage lasted longer than 10 years.  In all cases, an individual is paid first
the benefit that he or she would collect on the basis of his or her own earnings record.  If the spouse or
survivor benefits would be more, the individual is considered a “dual beneficiary,” and an additional
payment is made to raise the benefits to the level of spouse or survivor benefits they are entitled to.6
As a result of these rules, only the high earner in a household generates spouse and survivor
benefits for their spouse.  In addition, the more a secondary earner makes, the less spouse and survivor
benefits are worth to the family.  Thus spouse and survivor benefits are of greatest value to one earner
couples, which often are families where the earnings of the working spouse are relatively high.  For such7
families, while the progressive benefit formula would appear to work to the advantage of a secondary
earner, the availability of spouse and survivor benefits largely negates this advantage.  Even if the
secondary worker did not work, he or she would often collect nearly the same amount of benefits
anyway as spouse or survivor benefits. 
B.  Individual Versus Family Earnings.
However benefits are calculated, whether they include only the basic benefit or spouse and
survivor benefits, measures of redistribution will differ depending on whether they are calculated over
individuals or over families.   Thus it is worthwhile to briefly discuss how earnings in the family relate to
earnings by individuals. 
Lifetime income for each individual is the sum over the working life of the individual’s wage rate
in each year times the fraction of that year worked.  Some of the individual earners are husbands and
some are wives.  Typically, the earnings of wives are lower than those of their husbands, because the
wage rate is lower, because the fraction of each year worked is lower, and because the number of
years worked are lower.  As a result, redistribution fostered by the Social Security System, when
measured among individuals, will to some extent involve redistribution from husbands with higher
earnings to wives with lower earnings.
Thus when we ask how well social security redistributes benefits among families according to
their incomes, and how the redistribution among families relates to the redistribution among individuals,
it will be important to consider how individuals aggregate into family units.  Lifetime family incomes are
simply the sum of the lifetime individual incomes of the two spouses.  As Smith (1979) carefully
explains, the relationships between the distributions of individual and family earnings will depend on the7 In wave 1, 72 percent of respondents gave permission to link social security earnings histories
to their interview record.  That was raised to 80 percent as a result of additional attempts in waves 2
and 3 to obtain permissions.  Records were actually linked for 95 percent of those who gave
permissions. 
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correlation between the wage offers to husbands and their wives, which we expect to be positive as
long as schooling is correlated between husbands and wives, and on the variation of labor supply with
own and with spouse’s earnings. If wives work less in households where husbands have high earnings,
that will narrow the distribution of family earnings relative to the earnings distribution of individual
earnings.
Our aim in the empirical section is to determine the extent of redistribution fostered by the
current Social Security System on the basis of each individual’s earnings, and then to see how the
extent of redistribution changes when we instead look at redistribution on the basis of total family
earnings and finally at redistribution on the basis of potential family earnings, which is what the family
could earn if both partners worked full time.
III.  The Data.
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a longitudinal, nationally representative study of
older Americans.  The survey began in 1992 with an initial cohort of 12,652 individuals from 7,607
households, with at least one household member born from 1931 to 1941.  Social security earnings
histories were linked for 9472 respondents, or about 75 percent of the respondents to the survey.7  Of
the respondents with linked earnings histories, there were 7370 who were born between 1931 and
1941, for whom the HRS is representative.  In the HRS nomenclature, these respondents are said to be8We are aware that changes in social security to be adopted in the future may reduce benefits
or raise taxes for younger cohorts, equivalent to twenty percent of their benefits or more.  Without
knowing how revisions will be shaped, and if some degree of privatization will be introduced, we have
no way of knowing how redistribution will be changed by any remedy that is adopted in the future. 
Thus we focus on outcomes that are consistent with current social security benefit formulas and taxes,
for a generation that is on the verge of retirement.
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“age eligible.”  The remaining respondents are included in the survey because they were married to age
eligible respondents, but by themselves they do not form a representative sample of those age groups.
There are a number of caveats we should mention at the outset of the empirical analysis.  First,
the HRS samples a cohort born from 1931 to1941.  Members of that cohort exhibit higher levels of
women’s labor force participation than are found in cohorts born before them, but lower levels of
participation than are found for cohorts born after 1941.  Thus the redistribution fostered by the Social
Security System will differ for the cohorts who follow the HRS.
The analysis uses the current benefit law and the tax schedules in place at the time wages were
earned.  The rules governing social security will certainly be subject to change as policy makers attempt
to introduce financial balance into a system that is insolvent in the long run.  But the HRS cohort is old
enough that while its members may experience some reduction in social security benefits, the scope for
such a reduction is narrowing as the cohort ages.  For example, even if there were a compromise that
raised the normal retirement age, as time passes, such a compromise is less and less likely to be applied
to those born before 1941.  Since most of the social security taxes levied on the HRS cohort have
already been paid, payroll tax increases enacted in the future also will have limited effect on the
members of this cohort.8
Third, in this paper, when calculating the current value of yearly social security benefits, we use9Note, however, that Liebman (1999) finds only modest differences in the rates of return to
social security when mortality tables are adjusted for education in addition to sex and race.
10If one uses a very low interest rate, it is possible to conclude that, when spouse benefits in
high income households are taken into account, the benefit formula is regressive in the way it
redistributes within generations.  See Steuerle and Bakija (1994).
11In particular, the AIME amounts reported in this section are the highest 35 years of earnings
through 1991, indexed to 1992 using the social security average earnings index.
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the mortality tables from the Social Security Administration which are age and gender specific, but do
not distinguish the effects of income or race on mortality.  We recognize that differences in mortality
related to income reduce any redistribution fostered by the social security benefit formula.  Members of
families with high incomes live longer than members of families with low incomes (e.g., see Duleep,
1989; Panis and Lillard, 1995).  Accordingly, our findings will overstate the extent of any redistribution
associated with the current social security benefit formula.9  
Fourth, findings are sensitive to the interest rates employed.  For the most part, we use actual
interest rates observed to date.  To project for the future, we use the intermediate interest rate and
wage growth assumptions from the Social Security Administration.10
IV.  Relation of AIME to Work History and Wage Rates.
In this section we assess the earnings and work patterns of the age eligible population in the
HRS.  The unit of observation throughout this section is the individual.  All information in the tables
assessing patterns of work and earnings is taken solely from the actual social security records from
1951 to 1991.11  Only age eligible respondents with actual social security records are analyzed in this
section, and only earnings prior to and including 1991 and earnings below the social security maximum12In calculating household earnings, or in categorizing an earner as a primary or secondary
earner in the family, it is occasionally necessary to impute the earnings of the spouse if the spouse (or
former spouse, in the case of widowed respondents and divorced respondents whose marriages lasted
10 years or more) does not have a social security record.
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are considered.12  The purpose of this section is to analyze the actual pattern of working years and the
wages over those working years, without introducing the uncertainties fostered by imputations. 
Widows and respondents who had been previously married 10 years or more are treated as married,
since their benefits may be affected by the earnings of their former spouses.  
A.  Averages by Sex, Marital Status, and Primary vs. Secondary Earner. 
First we consider in Table 1 the average values of average indexed yearly earnings (12 times
AIME) plus some additional variables measuring years of work and earnings.  These are: number of
years and average annual earnings in years with non-zero earnings, number of years and average annual
earnings in years with significant earnings (a concept to be explained shortly), and lifetime household
earnings.  The rows report results for the full sample and for subgroups divided by sex and marital
status.  The last two rows report for the high (primary) earner and low (secondary) earner in a
household.  The number of observations is the simple count of individual respondents, and the earnings
amounts are indexed to 1992 using the social security average annual earnings index and are in
thousands of dollars.
More specifically, Column 1 shows the average values of average indexed yearly earnings.  The
value is around $15,000 for all respondents, with average AIME’s of around $23,000 for males and
$8,000 for females.  The average AIME of unmarried males is considerably less than that of  married12
males, but the reverse is the case with unmarried females relative to their married counterparts.  The
second column of Table 1 reports the number of years with nonzero earnings (even if earnings were
$200 from a summer job) and annual earnings in years with nonzero earnings. All age eligible
respondents with matched records average 26 years of covered earnings through 1991 (the median is
29 years).  Annual earnings in those years average $17,000.  On average HRS respondents were 56
years old at the time of the HRS survey and were expecting to work about another seven years.  At
retirement, the AIME should be higher for median respondents by about a quarter.  A comparison of
the first three columns suggests that the reason that women have only a third the AIME of men is
because they work less than two thirds the number of years worked by men, and when they do work,
their yearly earnings are half those of men. 
To avoid including low-paying summer jobs and similar work in the averages, we introduce the
notion of “significant” earnings in Columns 4 and 5.  To calculate significant earnings, we first find the
average of the highest five years of indexed earnings (in order to mute the effect of a year of very high
earnings).   Earnings in any particular year are presumed to be significant if the indexed earnings in that
year are at least 25% of this average.  Thus for a person with a continuous earnings history, all earnings
are deemed to be significant as long as the ratio of high (five year average) to low real earnings is not
more than 4 to 1. Almost a fifth of the earnings years are excluded because they involved very low
earnings, and this ratio is slightly larger for women than for men.  Correspondingly, average earnings are
higher by about a sixth if years with very low earnings are excluded.  Again, this ratio is higher for
women than for men.
Lifetime earnings of households sum the earnings of men and women in two earner households,13In his analysis of distribution, Liebman (1999) arrays families according to the earnings of the
primary earner.
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or include the earnings of the single earner in the case of unmarried individuals.  Households with
women have about 95 percent of the earnings of households with men, reflecting the lower earnings and
greater number of single women than single men.
Although we will not analyze in detail the redistribution from singles to marrieds, there are
considerable differences between married and unmarried.  Married men have about ten percent more
years of covered earnings than unmarried men, and for married men, earnings in years of nonzero
earnings are about a quarter higher.  Married women have about four fifths of the years of nonzero
earnings of unmarried women, and about three fourths of the earnings in years that they worked.  
The last two rows of Table 1 report similar statistics for primary vs. secondary earnings.13  In
married households, the highest earner is denoted as primary, and the spouse is secondary.  The earner
in single households is considered primary.  It is clear from these figures that both work and earnings
when working differ considerably between primary and secondary earners.  We do not find anything
near earnings parity within HRS households.  Thus we can very clearly expect the distributions of family
earnings to be more concentrated, e.g., to exhibit a lower ratio of standard deviation to the mean, than
the distributions of individual earnings.
B.  Earnings Measures and Measures of Years of Work by AIME.
Table 2 begins an examination of years of work and earnings when working among individuals
falling in different AIME categories.  The first six columns report, by AIME, the same information as in
Table 1, and the last column is the weighted percentage of observations falling within the specified14For many individuals, low wages are the result of choosing to work part-time, and/or to
interrupt consecutive years of employment with a number of years out of the labor force.  Thus
significant earnings may understate potential earnings had the individual worked full-time over their adult
life.
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AIME range, using HRS weights.  Thus, the 1481 respondents in the first row, who have annualized
AIME’s of from 0 to $3000,  make up a weighted 19% of the total of 7370 respondents.  Notice from
the last column of the table that almost a third of the respondents have annualized AIME’s of $6000 or
less, while the top third have annualized AIME’s of $21,000 or more.  The median AIME lies in the
fifth bracket at about $13,000 per year at an annualized rate.
As noted above, on average HRS respondents were born in 1936, so they were 56 years old
at the time of the HRS survey, and were expecting to work about another seven years. As of 1992,
those in the lowest AIME category have only worked 9 years.  AIME is calculated on the basis of
highest 35 years of earnings, so those in the lowest AIME category worked about a quarter of the
years included in the AIME calculation.  If they worked another seven years on average, they would
end up working for half the period.  But given their track record, most of those in this group would
work less than that, if at all.  The twelve percent of the sample that falls in the second AIME category
have worked 18 years.  If they worked seven more years, they would end up working two thirds of the
35 years used in calculating AIME.  However, they too will probably work a smaller fraction of the 35
year period.  Clearly an important reason for having a low AIME is that one has not consistently
worked.  Even in years when they have worked, workers with low AIME’s are less likely to be
working “significantly,” suggesting that low earners have more uneven earnings streams than high
earners.1415The imputed match is done on the basis of gender, cohort, race (3 categories), earnings (6
categories), and assets (8 categories), which are available for the spouse even if the spouse was not
interviewed.  For the match, we look at  married respondents who had characteristics which were
identical (or as nearly so as we could find) to the characteristics of the non-interviewed spouse.  For
widows and divorced respondents, we do not have any information about the former spouse, so the
match is based on the characteristics of the respondent.  In this case, we try to find  spouses who were
married to individuals with the same gender, cohort,  race, and educational attainment (7 categories) as
the widowed or divorced respondent.  We substitute educational attainment for earnings and assets,
since earnings and assets can be significantly affected by the fact of widowhood or divorce.
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Low earnings in each year worked are also a cause of low AIME, as is clear from the data in
column 2 of the table.  As one moves down the lowest five AIME categories, the change in average
earnings and the change in years with nonzero earnings appear to be roughly of equal importance in
explaining the variation in AIME.  From the sixth AIME category on, that is above median AIME, most
people will have worked in most years since leaving school, so that the increase in the wage as one
proceeds up the AIME categories provides most of the explanation for the increase in AIME.
Lifetime household (family) earnings (husband and wife, or sole earner) are reported in the fifth
column of Table 2 by AIME category. Lifetime family earnings include the sum total of all social
security covered earnings in the 1951-1991 period, indexed to 1992 by the social security average
annual earnings index.  For individuals whose spouses did not have social security records, the records
were imputed by matching procedures.15  For married, widowed, and divorced (with a marriage which
lasted at least 10 years) respondents, the household earnings is the sum of the lifetime earnings of the
respondent and the spouse.
Lifetime family earnings are not nearly as dispersed as are AIME amounts.  They increase from
$620,000 to $1,560,000 from the lowest to highest AIME categories, an increase of only 2.5 times in16
lifetime family earnings.  There is a corresponding increase in AIME of 24 times from lowest to highest
category.  This comparison suggests that AIME is a rather poor indicator of lifetime earnings of the
household.   It also suggests that individuals falling in the bottom AIME category are not as poor as
their AIME suggests.  Consequently, we can expect that although the social security benefit formula
appears to be very progressive, it is going to be less effective in redistributing benefits among families
according to lifetime earnings than is suggested by its sharp progressive structure.  To be sure, those
with fewest years of covered earnings, and lowest earnings when working, fall in the bottom AIME
category.  But their spouses frequently have higher earnings, and that limits the effectiveness of any
redistribution based on AIME of the covered individual.
Table 3 breaks out the results of Table 2 by gender; to avoid unnecessary clutter only the
results for significant earnings are presented.  As we go down the columns, the years of earnings within
each AIME group and average earnings in those years is very similar for the two genders.  The major
differences are in the last two columns for each group.  Almost two thirds of women fall within the
lowest three AIME groups, with almost one third falling within the very lowest AIME group, which
averages 6 years of significant work and $6,000 in average earnings in those year.  In contrast, only 15
percent of men fall within the lowest three AIME groups.  Because the women fall predominantly in the
lowest AIME groups, with few years of earnings and low earnings in those years, overall they have 60
percent of the years of significant earnings  compared to men, and 50 percent of the earnings in those
years, as reported in the last row of the table.  These results suggest that when we aggregate the men
and women living in the same households to compute a measure of family earnings, the distributions will
become relatively narrower.17
The other notable thing about Table 3 is in the lifetime household earnings column.  For men,
low AIME amounts are associated with very low levels of lifetime household earnings, but for women
the household earnings amounts corresponding to low AIME’s are much higher.  Men with AIME’s
between 0 and $3,000 have lifetime household earnings of only $170,000, but women with the same
level of AIME have household earnings of almost $700,000.  This is another indication that women
with low AIME’s may be married with men with higher earning power, although the same does not
seem to be true of men with low AIME’s.
C.  The Distribution of Significant Earnings by AIME.
Table 2 reports average significant earnings by AIME category.  Table 4 indicates the
distribution of those significant earnings within each AIME category.  The entries in the table  are
percentages of those in the AIME category with the indicated levels of annual significant earnings. 
Thus, 25% of the individuals in the $0-3,000 annualized AIME bracket had 0 to $3,000 of significant
earnings in years in which they had positive significant earnings, and 27% of them had $3,000 to
$6,000 of significant earning in years when they had earnings.  The figures in any column of the table
add up to 100 percent.
Comparing significant earnings with AIME, there are many observations that appear to have
much higher significant earnings than their average indexed earnings, suggesting again that one reason
for their low realized earnings is few years of work with significant earnings.  Almost half (48 percent)
of those with an annualized AIME of 0 to $3,000 have significant earnings averaging $6,000 or more in
each year of work with significant earnings.  However, they have significant earnings less than half the
time.  Of those with annualized AIMEs from $3000 to $6,000, 44 percent have significant earnings of18
$12,000 or more, and 4.7 percent have significant earnings of more than $21,000.  Similar patterns are
evident for the next few AIME categories as well.  In all of these cases, much higher earnings than is
suggested by their AIME goes together with a significant number of years not worked.  Another
indication of the importance of differences in years of work is the difference between the median value
of significant earnings, $19,400, and the median AIME of about $12,600.
These distributions are sufficiently widespread to suggest that when AIME is used as a basis for
redistributing social security benefits, some with high earnings potential are beneficiaries of the resulting
redistribution.  Significant numbers of workers falling in the low AIME categories have high earnings in
years of covered employment.  Consequently, many workers falling in the lower AIME categories are
there because they work few years, rather than because they have low earnings potential.  The result is
a disparity between earnings in years of covered work and AIME.
The benefit formula treats generously everyone who is in a low AIME category, regardless of
whether the cause is a low level of earnings or few years of work.  So a part of the redistribution of
social security benefits is from those who work more years to those who work fewer years. 
Presumably, those who are falling the in low AIME categories with high earnings potentials are spouses
who choose not to participate for many years in the labor market.  The next set of results considers the
consequences of these participation outcomes for the distribution of family earnings.
D.  Further Details on the Distribution of Family Earnings By AIME.
Table 5 presents the distribution of lifetime family income grouped by the AIME category of the
respondents, as measured by the total indexed social security earnings of both spouses.  Note that for a
married couple, there will be two entries in the table, one for the AIME level of each spouse.  The most19
notable feature of this table, particularly for the lower AIME brackets, is the bimodal distributions of the
lifetime household incomes within each AIME bracket.  There is a cluster of individuals at the lowest
observed level of lifetime household income for each AIME bracket.  These are presumably
respondents who never married or whose spouses are essentially not working.  At a considerably
higher level of lifetime household income there is a broader peak of respondents who, although their
own AIME is relatively low, are married to individuals with considerably higher lifetime earnings.  In the
bottom two AIME categories, for example, 15-20% have lifetime household earnings in excess of
$1,250,000, which is 25% above the median lifetime household earnings level of about $1,000,000.
Table 6 decomposes the first five columns of Table 5 by gender.  Among the women, the same
bimodal distribution is evident, if anything even more pronounced.  Among the men, however, the
bimodal distribution essentially disappears.  For men who have low levels of AIME, only a relatively
small number have lifetime household earnings that are very high.  Relatively few men are in these
categories, with only 15% having annualized AIME levels of less than $9,000, but those men are likely
to live in households with very limited lifetime resources.  The same is not true for women.  The majority
of  women are in the lowest three AIME brackets, but most of them have fairly high family lifetime
earnings.
V.  Redistribution of Social Security Taxes and Benefits Among Individuals and Families.
The next set of results deals with distributions of social security taxes and benefits.  Since in this
section we are more concerned with redistribution, rather than with distributions of work and earnings,
we felt that it was important to include the full sample in these calculations.  Hence, we include all age16Specifically, we used starting date on their current job, starting and ending dates for their last
jobs (i.e., the job last held by those not working in 1992), a previous 5 year job, and up to two other
jobs with pensions. Respondents were also asked about final earnings on those jobs.  In addition, we
used information in Wave 3 about the date of entry into the labor force, how many years were worked
before the date the previous job was secured, and how many years of work were in jobs covered by
social security.  Earnings for other years are estimated by adjusting observed earnings on the basis of
experience.  The coefficients for experience, based on data from the Survey of Consumer Finances,
are: experience .0138, experience squared  -.000283, and experience * education .000996
(Anderson, Gustman and Steinmeier, 1999).
17Future earnings are projected by assuming that real earnings observed in the last year in the
1991 will persist until the respondent’s expected retirement date.  If the respondent has no earnings in
1991, zeros are projected for future years.  If the expected retirement age was greater than 70, or if the
individual indicated that he never expected to retire, a retirement age of 70 was used unless the
individual had already worked beyond that age in 1992.  If the respondent did not provide an expected
retirement age, an age of 62 was used, again unless the respondent had already worked beyond that
age.
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eligible respondents, regardless of whether they had a social security record or not, and we impute
records for those for whom none was obtained.16  Further, these results use earnings which are
projected beyond 1991 until the individual’s indicated expected retirement age 17.  The AIME figures
reported in this section are the real value of the expected actual AIME.  Nominal earnings amounts are
indexed by the social security average annual earnings index up to age 60, as specified in the AIME
calculation rules, and the value of the nominal AIME is adjusted from age 62 to 1992 using the Social
Security Administration’s projected inflation rate.
A.  Alternative Measures of Redistribution.
Table 7 presents baseline results for all age eligible respondents using own benefits and taxes.
Each column of figures pertains to ten percent of the covered individuals, with the deciles defined18Table 7 and those that follow group the population by AIME decile, which is a change from
the first 6 tables.  The earlier tables address the question of how hours and earnings are distributed in
each AIME category, and having even dollar brackets facilitates that discussion. However, the
distributional issues discussed in Tables 7 to 10 are most easily understood if the population is grouped
into deciles.
19The taxes and benefits are calculated ex-ante from the time the individual starts paying taxes. 
20Because taxes are collected on average 30 years or so earlier than benefits are paid, this
amount is extremely sensitive to the exact series used to discount taxes and wages to a common date.
21As noted earlier, if efforts to fix the insolvency of the system are adopted soon enough, the
shortfall of benefits below taxes in Table 5 may understate the shortfall between benefits and taxes
experienced by the HRS cohort.  But the HRS cohort is old enough that its members may not
experience a further reductions in social security benefits.  Without knowing how revisions will be
shaped, and if some degree of privatization will be introduced, we have no way of knowing how
redistribution will be changed by any remedy that is adopted.  Using similar reasoning, it will be
dangerous to project the experience of the HRS cohort onto younger cohorts without making significant
adjustments.  
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according to place in the distribution of AIME. 18 The first two rows are ex ante expected taxes and
expected benefits.  To calculate these figures, the taxes and benefits each year are adjusted for the
probability of collecting them.19  The resulting figures are then indexed to 1992 using the 10 year
government bond rate if the year is before 1992, or the Social Security Administration’s projected
interest rate if the year is after 1992.  Finally, the adjusted taxes are added to get the figures in the table,
and the same is done for benefits. Taxes and benefits are measured in thousands of 1992 dollars, and
Table 7 includes results for all eligible respondents.  
The last column of the table indicates that for the HRS cohort, on average social security taxes
will exceed benefits.  The difference is about $15,000 per age eligible HRS respondent.20  We use the
current law, rather than a hypothetical law revised to restore financial balance in the system, as the
baseline in judging the current amount of redistribution.21  Reflecting the progressivity of the benefit22
formula, respondents’ benefits exceed taxes through the bottom half of the income distribution.  For the
upper half of the distribution by AIME, taxes exceed benefits, by increasing amounts as we move
through the deciles.  The lowest decile does not have more than $500 in either taxes or benefits
because if they have worked at all, they generally will not have worked more than the 10 years
necessary to entitle them to benefits.
The next two rows are measures of redistribution within the deciles.  The gini coefficients are
based on a diagram where the horizontal axis is the cumulative weighted taxes, and the vertical axis is
the cumulative weighted benefits.  The gini coefficient for the first decile is omitted since few taxes are
paid or benefits received for this group.  From the second decile on, the gini coefficients fall gradually,
suggesting that the amount of redistribution within AIME categories declines with higher incomes.  The
gini coefficient in the last column, which measures redistribution among the entire population, reflects the
redistribution among the various deciles, and is higher than the coefficients within the individual deciles.
The next row is an alternative measure of redistribution within the column group.  To get these
figures, the actual benefits of each individual are compared to the benefits that individual would have
received if benefits were the same proportion of taxes as they are for that group.  If the actual benefits
are more than the pro-rata benefits, given the taxes, we can say that benefits were redistributed to this
individual from other members of the group.  The difference between the actual benefits and the pro-
rata benefits is a measure of the amount of redistribution to (from) this individual.  The values reported
in the table for this row are the sum of the redistributions for all individuals who had positive
redistributions, divided by the total benefits for the group in the column.  This measure is essentially the
maximum gap between the gini curve and the 45% line in the diagram for the gini coefficient.  A figure23
of 10% means that of the total benefits received by the group, 10% would have to be redistributed from
some individuals of the group to other individuals in order for everyone to receive the same ratio of
benefits to taxes paid.  The values reported in this row have a similar pattern to the one observed for
the gini coefficient.  The value of 14.1% in the last column means that for the entire population, the
amount of redistributed benefits amounts to 14.1% of total benefits.
The next two rows of the table measure redistribution among the various deciles.  The first of
these two rows compares actual benefits of the group to the benefits that would have been received if 
benefits were simply pro-rated to taxes for the entire population.  This measure of redistribution is a
measure of net redistribution to the decile.  For instance, the value of 37% in the fourth decile means
that the actual benefits of that decile are 37% higher than would be the case if benefits were
proportional of taxes for the entire population.  This 37% obviously comes at the expense of other
deciles.  Again, this measure is essentially meaningless for the first decile, which pays few taxes and
receives almost no benefits.  In the second and third deciles, over half of the benefits received by those
in those deciles are due to redistribution of benefits from other deciles.  On the other hand, those in the
top AIME decile receive 33% less than their pro-rata share of taxes; those benefits are redistributed to
those in other deciles.
The row labeled as “Share of Total Redistribution@ looks at redistribution to those in the
AIME decile in another light.  The previous row expressed the net redistribution to the group as a
percentage of total benefits to the group, but this row expresses the net redistribution to the group as a
percentage of the total amount redistributed for all individuals.  The share of redistribution rises
between the second and third deciles principally because the benefit amounts are larger in the third24
decile, but from the third decile on, the share of redistribution measure again declines as AIME
increases.   The top two deciles provide almost two-thirds of the total amounts redistributed.  The
redistribution is slightly negative for the first decile because this decile pays some taxes but almost never
receives benefits because they do not have the requisite 10 years of work.  Another point of note in this
row is that the positive amounts (as do the negative amounts) sum to about 76.5%.  This means that
almost three quarters of the total redistribution is among the deciles, with only a quarter redistributed
within the deciles.
The final rows of the table give percentiles for internal rates of return.  Before calculating these
rates, the taxes and benefits are indexed to 1992 using the historical CPI or the projected social
security inflation rate.  That means that these rates are effectively real rates.  To get these figures, each
individual in the group has a real internal rate of return calculated.  These rates are then arrayed by
value, and the (weighted) percentiles are found by picking the appropriate spot in the distribution.  An
examination of these figures reveals that when the benefits approximately equal taxes in the previous
rows, the internal rates of return are approximately 3.0%.  Another way to interpret this is that the
average of the historical real returns for the HRS cohort has been approximately 3.0%.  Note also that
the percentage of observations is a weighted percentage, as in the previous tables.  On average, these
real rates of return are 4.8 percent for those in the 90th percentile of returns, to 0.4 percent for those in
the 10th percentile of returns.  The distributions of returns decline as expected as AIME increases.
B.  Measures of Redistribution Using Individual and Family Benefits and Individual AIME
Distribution.
Table 8 reports benefits redistributed shares, gini coefficients, and median rate of return.  The22More specifically, the first section uses only the social security taxes, including the employer
share but excluding the medicare taxes, and the benefits that the respondent will collect on the basis of
his or her own earnings.  The second set uses the same taxes but includes the benefits that the spouse
will collect on the basis of the respondents earnings over and above the benefits that the spouse would
collect anyway based on the spouse’s own earnings.  The third set of calculations sums the ex ante
taxes and total benefits of the two partners, even if one of the partners has died or if the partners are
divorced, as long as they were married for 10 years or more.  This treats married and
widowed/divorced respondents on an equal ex ante basis, and does not treat differently the woman
whose husband dies one year before the survey differently from the women whose husband dies one
year after the survey.  We impute former husband’s earnings based on individuals matched via the
process described in footnote 15.
23When we recalculate Table 5 separately for men and women, we find that for men, taxes paid
(1150) exceed benefits (765) by a wide margin.  For women, taxes (448) fall short of benefits (513),
indicating that women benefit from redistribution.  On average their benefits are increased 29 percent,
and they receive 88 percent of all benefits redistributed, while men donate 22 percent of their benefits
to accomplish this redistribution. 
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first row simply repeats some of the results from the final column of Table 7.   The next two rows split
the results into men and women separately.  The second section reports results when benefits include, in
addition to own benefits, spouse and survivor benefits, while the third section counts social security
benefits and taxes for both spouses in the household.22  Each section takes us another step toward
considering  redistribution at the level of the family.
The first column of Table 8 gives amount of redistribution among all individuals in the group.
For the first row, redistribution is measured among all respondents in the sample.  The second and third
rows suggest that there is less redistribution within the groups of men and women taken separately than
for all respondents.  The reason is that much of the redistribution based on own benefits is from men to
women, because, as we have seen above, the AIMEs for women are consistently lower than they are
for men.23
The second section of the table suggests that there is less redistribution among all individuals24Since the family redistributions are identical for husbands and wives, the weights of married
(and widowed or divorced) respondents are given half weight in order to avoid double counting of
these redistributions
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when own and spouse benefits are taken into account.  As suggested by the earlier literature, high
AIME respondents apparently benefit disproportionately from spouse and survivor benefits, suggesting
their spouses have lower earnings relative to their own.  Notice that there is little change within the
men’s and women’s groups when own and spouse benefits are taken into account.  It is the apparent
redistribution among all individuals, and again importantly from men to women, that is reduced when
own and spouse benefits are counted. Finally, the amount of redistribution declines again when family
benefits are attributed to each respondent.24  What is happening here is that within the household, the
redistribution towards spouses who worked part of their lifetimes are offset by the redistribution away
from the husband.  The redistribution to single women from men is not netted out, however, and this
means that there is more redistribution when all respondents are grouped than within the groups of men
and women alone.
The second column of the Table 8 presents gini coefficients.  Benefits and taxes are more
unequally distributed among women than men.  When all respondents are pooled, the amount of
inequality between benefits and taxes, and thus the amount of redistribution, declines when own and
spouse benefits are counted.  There is a further decline, particularly among women, when family
benefits and taxes are attributed to each respondent. 
The last column 8 indicates median rates of return by sex and type of benefit.  Reflecting the
greater redistribution to women, from row 1 we see that rates of return to social security are almost27
twice as high for women than men.  When spouse and survivor benefits are taken into account and
attributed to the earner who is responsible, the rates of return increase within the group of all
respondents and within the group of men.  There is no change within the group of women because, by
and large their husbands’ earnings are higher than their own earnings, and as a result, there is little value
to the spouse and survivor benefits they accrue.  Taking family benefits into account slightly increases
the rate of return for men and for all, and reduces the rate of return for women.
C.  Measures of Redistribution Using Individual and Family AIME Distributions.
Table 9 reports the redistribution to those falling in each decile group, under various definitions
of the group and of relevant benefits.  The redistribution is measured as the percentage of benefits
accruing to the decile which have been redistributed from other deciles, so that the first row of Table 9
simply repeats the fifth row of Table 7.  The first panel of Table 9 uses the annualized AIME of the
individual, while the second panel combines this with the annualized AIME of the spouse if the
respondent is married, widowed, or divorced.  Within each panel, redistribution to the decile is
reported first on the basis of own benefits and taxes, second using a definition that also adds spouse
and survivor benefits based on the respondent’s own earnings, and third on the basis of family benefits
and taxes for each respondent. 
Looking at the top panel of the table, we find much less redistribution moving from the top row,
where we report the redistribution according to the simple social security formula, to the third row,
which reports redistribution using total family benefits.  For those in the second to sixth deciles, the
redistribution declines sharply between the first row and the third row, and in particular from the second
row to the third row, where family benefits are considered.  As with Table 8, the introduction of family25  The observations in this table are still individuals, although they are now classified by family
AIME.  In some results, Liebman (1999) classifies families based on the AIME for the high earner; in
others he classifies families based on the AIME for the total covered earnings of both spouses. In the
latter case, he divides both taxes and benefits evenly among each spouse, a treatment that by itself
would generate tables that, during the period of the marriage, are analogous to the tables we construct
that report redistribution based on family AIME.
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benefits causes the high redistribution to at least some low AIME women to be offset by the
redistribution away from their spouses, reducing the net redistribution. In the second decile, this effect
reduces redistribution from a half of benefits to a quarter, and in the third to fifth deciles, the share of
benefits due to redistribution falls by a fifth of total benefits or more.  However, in the top two deciles,
the principal reduction in redistribution occurs when we add spouse and survivor benefits.  In these
deciles the spouse and survivor benefits are most valuable, since they accrue primarily to higher wage
individuals whose spouses have relatively low AIME’s.
In the bottom panel of the table, regrouping the deciles according to family AIME’s, which are
roughly equivalent to lifetime family earnings, there are two findings of note.25  First, the pattern of
changes when we add spouse and survivor benefits, and then family benefits, essentially reproduces the
pattern in the top panel.  This indicates that the same processes which produced the pattern in the top
panel continues to operate even when we look at lifetime family income rather than lifetime individual
income.  However, the levels of redistribution in the bottom panel are almost always lower than in the
top panel.  The deciles in the bottom panel are simply a reshuffling of the same respondents in the top
panel, except that in the reshuffing some high AIME individuals are coupled with lower AIME
individuals, and vice versa.  In this regard, note that the distribution of family AIME amounts is relatively26For instance, the gap between the 25th and 75th percentiles of individual AIME’s is from
about $6,000 to about 28,000, or 4.5 to 1, while the similar gap of family AIME’s is from about
$11,000 to about $39,000, or 3.5 to 1.
27As before, “significant” earnings are 25% or more of the average of the 5 highest earnings
years, after adjustment to 1992 dollars using the CPI.  The combined total significant annual earnings is
simply the sum of the annual earnings of the husband and the wife.  All of the earnings figures in Table
10 include all earnings, not just covered earnings or those below the social security maximum earnings
amount. 
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narrower than the distribution of individual AIME amounts.26  This process also reshuffles some
individuals with high individual AIME’s and high losses from redistribution to deciles lower in the family
AIME distribution, thereby tending to reduce the redistribution among the deciles.  As can be seen
when we compare the redistribution observed in the top row of Panel A of Table 9 with the bottom
row of Panel B, the measured redistribution is halved when respondents are grouped by their family’s
AIME, and benefits and taxes are considered at the family level, rather than when individuals are
ordered by their own AIME and only individual benefits are considered.
VI.  Redistribution When Families Are Classified
By Earnings Capacity (Significant Earnings).
Table 10 reports on benefits lost or gained as a result of redistribution when respondents are
grouped by earnings capacity, as measured by“significant earnings”.27  The AIME measures of Tables 7
to 9 are roughly proportional to realized lifetime earnings, while significant earnings are roughly
proportional to potential lifetime earnings.  The two concepts differ because not all potential earnings28 For example, if the wife earns $40,000 for 7 years, her significant annual earnings are
$40,000 even if she is out of the labor force for the other years.
29Coronado, Fullerton and Glass (1999a) order families based on full family earnings, which
assumes that each spouse works full time at the wage observed when they were working.  We obtain
the same ordering among families when we use “significant earnings” for the family to order families by
their earnings capacity.  They also make an alternative calculation where they use the average wage for
the sample to value leisure at the same price across each individual.
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will be realized if the respondent has extended periods not working.28  In the first panel of Table 10,
each respondent is ordered according to the individual respondent’s “significant earnings”.  The
second panel orders respondents by the “significant earnings” for the respondent’s family.29  
As we have seen earlier, especially for those in the lower deciles, their significant earnings are
much higher than their AIME.  That is, many of those with a low AIME have not worked many years,
but when they did work, their yearly earnings were much higher than their AIME suggests.  As a result,
the brackets for the bottom deciles of earners in Table 10 are much wider than the brackets in Table 9.  
Compared to the top panel of Table 9, the redistribution percentages in the top panel of Table
10 appear to be slightly less.  This occurs because some individuals with low realized AIME’s
nevertheless have higher potential earnings, and therefore higher “significant” earnings.  These
individuals, who receive positive amounts of redistribution, are reshuffled to higher deciles when
significant earnings are considered, and therefore tend to dilute the negative redistributions in those
deciles.  This in turn reduces the measured extent of redistribution among deciles when significant
earnings are considered.
However, the major finding of Table 10 comes in looking at the bottom row of the bottom
panel.  This row looks at family taxes and benefits for individuals grouped according to the potential31
earnings of the family.  Compare this to the first row of Table 9, which looks at the individual taxes and
benefits according to the actual earnings of the individual.  The redistribution figures in the bottom row
of Table 10 appear to be roughly a quarter of the corresponding figures in the top row of Table 9.  The
implication is that when family taxes and benefits are used, and when respondents are grouped
according to their total potential family income, the redistribution among deciles is dramatically reduced. 
That is, the amount of redistribution from families with high potential income to families with low
potential income, the type of redistribution that most of us think about when we talk about
redistribution, is much lower than an analysis grouping individuals according to individual realized
earnings would suggest.  Instead, much of the redistribution among families based on potential family
income must occur within deciles.  The obvious candidate is transfers from families with two earners to
traditional families with roughly the same combined earning power but in which only one spouse is a
lifetime worker.
Figure 1 uses rates of return to summarize these results.  The top panel shows the strong
redistribution when deciles are computed according to each respondent’s AIME, and also shows the
25th to 75th percentile range of the rates of return within each decile.  In the second panel, where
individuals are grouped by family AIME, the solid line becomes flatter, corresponding to the finding
above that almost half the redistribution fostered by the social security benefit formula is eliminated
when we evaluate redistribution on a family rather than on an individual basis.  In the third panel, where
families are grouped according to their significant earnings, the system redistributes hardly at all. 
Virtually all of the redistribution is within deciles rather than between deciles.  Taken together these
results suggest that whatever redistribution exists under the current system is largely redistribution32
among families with similar potential earnings capacities and benefits traditional families with a spouse
who chooses not to work.
VI. Conclusion.
This paper has investigated the extent to which the social security benefit formula redistributes
benefits from high to low earners.  The extent of redistribution that is found depends on how one defines
high earners.  The benefit formula clearly redistributes own benefits from own taxes when incomes are
measured for each individual by own AIME.  Much of the redistribution at the individual level is from
men to women. The extent of redistribution is halved, however, when benefits and taxes for both
spouses are analyzed at the level of the family. Moreover, the remaining redistribution is mostly from
families that have spent many years in the labor force to those with fewer years of work.  Thus when
we array families by earnings in years that they work, which is a measure of potential earnings, we find
that the benefit formula redistributes very little from families with high earnings potential to families with
low earnings potential. 
A direct examination of the social security benefit formula, and a finding that benefits are
redistributed from high to low earners when people are classified according to own AIME, might
suggest to policy makers that the current system is highly redistributive.  One might then believe that
there is a considerable potential cost in terms of foregone redistribution to going from the present
system to an alternative that does not explicitly redistribute, e.g., to a system of national retirement
accounts that is neutral with regard to redistribution.  However, our evidence suggests that it is a
mistake to argue for the current social security benefit formula on the grounds that it is highly30Feldstein and Liebman (1999) discuss features of a system of individualized accounts that
would foster redistribution.
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redistributive from families with high earnings potential to families with lower potential.  A better
argument could be made if the focus were on redistributing from two earner families to traditional
families with one earner and a stay-at-home spouse.
Without repeating all of the caveats mentioned earlier, it is appropriate to end with a word of
caution.  The results presented in this paper pertain only to a single cohort, those born from 1931 to
1941. Further investigation is required before these findings can be generalized to the cohorts that will
follow.  Nevertheless, it is clear from these results that the general perception that a great deal of
redistribution from the rich to the poor is accomplished by the progressive social security benefit
formula is greatly exaggerated.  As a result, adoption of a social security scheme with individual
accounts designed to be neutral with regard to redistribution would make much less difference to the
distribution of social security benefits and taxes among families with different earnings capacities than is
commonly believed.3034
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   All Respondents        $ 15 K 26       $ 17K 22       $ 20K         $ 980K 7370
   Males 23 32 24 27 27 1010 3389
   Females 8 21 12 16 14 960 3981
   Married Males 23 32 24 28 28 1050 3067
   Married Females 8 20 11 16 14 1010 3602
   Unmarried Males 16 29 18 27 21 570 322
   Unmarried Females 12 25 15 21 17 440 379
   Primary Earners 20 31 22 26 25 870 4403
   Secondary Earners 7 10 11 15 14 1140 2967
*Significant earnings are indexed yearly earnings that amount to at least 25 percent of the average of the high five years of indexed earnings.37
Table 2





















  $   0-3K 9         $ 5K 6         $ 6K       $ 620K 1481            19%
       3-6 18 9 13 12 730 919 12
       6-9 24 12 18 15 830 719 9
     9-12 27 14 21 18 900 638 8
   12-15 30 16 24 20 980 531 7
   15-18 32 19 26 22 1000 454 6
   18-21 33 21 28 25 1050 410 5
   21-24 35 23 30 27 1110 408 6
   24-27 35 26 31 29 1210 386 5
   27-30 36 29 32 32 1260 391 6
   30-33 36 31 33 34 1410 429 7
   33-36 37 33 33 37 1470 367 6
   36+ 39 35 36 38 1560 237 4
All Respondents 26 17 22 20 980 7370 100
*Significant earnings are indexed yearly earnings that amount to at least 25 percent of the average of the high five years of indexed earnings.38
Table 3



























  $   0-3K 7      $ 8K     $ 170K          5% 6      $ 6K    $ 690K        31%
       3-6 12 14 280 5 14 12 840 18
       6-9 16 17 430 5 19 14 950 14
     9-12 20 18 510 6 21 17 1070 11
   12-15 24 20 660 6 25 19 1180 8
   15-18 26 22 770 7 26 23 1220 6
   18-21 28 24 880 7 28 25 1310 4
   21-24 30 27 980 9 30 26 1440 3
   24-27 31 29 1150 9 30 30 1490 2
   27-30 32 32 1230 11 32 32 1450 2
   30-33 33 34 1380 13 30 37 1730 1
   33-36 33 37 1460 12 34 35 1650 1
   36+ 36 38 1560 8 36 37 1700 0
All Respondents 27 27 1010 100 16 14 960 100
*Significant earnings are indexed yearly earnings that amount to at least 25 percent of the average of the high five years of indexed earnings.39
Table 4
Distribution of Significant Earnings Within AIME Categories*
Annualized AIME
$ 0-3K 3-6 6-9 9-12 12-15 15-18 18-21 21-24 24-27 27-30 30-33 33-36 36+ All
Level of Significant
  Earnings*
   $  0- 3K      25% 5
       3- 6 27        3% 5
       6- 9 26 24        5% 8
       9-12 13 29 26        6% 9
     12-15 5 20 29 26      12% 9
     15-18 3 13 19 29 31      18%       1% 10
     18-21 1 7 11 20 24 28 20        3% 8
     21-24 3 6 11 17 22 32 30        5% 8
     24-27 1 2 5 9 17 25 29 32        6% 8
     27-30 1 2 3 8 12 22 30 33        7% 7
     30-33 1 1 2 4 4 8 20 30 38        7% 7
     33-36 1 3 3 3 7 18 29 37      15% 7
     36-39 1 2 3 2 5 13 26 71 6
     39-42 1 1 4 9 28 14 3
      42+ 1 1 1 3 3 4 3 1
Column Total    100%   100%   100%   100%    100%   100%   100%   100%    100%   100%   100%   100%   100%
Percent of
 Observations
19% 12 9 8 7 6 5 6 5 6 7 6 4 100
*Significant earnings are indexed yearly earnings that amount to at least 25 percent of the average of the high five years of indexed earnings.40
Table 5
Distribution of Lifetime Household Earnings Within AIME Categories
Annualized AIME
$ 0-3K 3-6 6-9 9-12 12-15 15-18 18-21 21-24 24-27 27-30 30-33 33-36 36+ All
Lifetime Household
  Earnings Level
 $      0-100K      28% 3
     100-200 6      27% 2
     200-300 5 6      24% 4
     300-400 4 4 9      24% 4
     400-500 4 4 5 12      21% 4
     500-750 11 10 11 12 24      46%     38%       3% 12
     750-1000 13 11 11 9 13 15 24 51      40%     12% 14
   1000-1250 15 15 12 9 7 9 11 20 24 48      36%     19% 17
   1250-1500 14 19 17 17 14 9 7 9 16 24 36 45      52% 20
   1500-2000 1 4 11 17 22 20 18 12 15 12 22 32 42 14
       2000+ 1 3 5 5 3 7 5 6 2
Column Total    100%   100%   100%   100%    100%   100%   100%   100%    100%   100%   100%   100%   100%
Percent of
  Observations
     19% 12 9 8 7 6 6 6 5 6 7 6 4 10041
Table 6
Distribution of Lifetime Household Earnings Within Lower AIME Categories By Gender
Males Females
Annualized AIME Annualized AIME
$ 0-3K 3-6 6-9 9-12 12-15 All $ 0-3K 3-6 6-9 9-12 12-15 All
Lifetime Household
  Earnings Level
 $      0-100K      58%        3%      13%        7%
     100-200 16      53% 3 4      21% 5
     200-300 10 18      38% 3 5 4      20% 5
     300-400 2 10 25      36% 4 4 3 4      19% 5
     400-500 4 8 11 27      26% 4 3 3 2 5      18% 4
     500-750 9 8 15 23 47 13 11 11 9 8 10 11
     750-1000 2 3 8 11 17 16 15 13 12 8 10 13
   1000-1250 2 1 7 19 18 18 16 13 8 15
   1250-1500 1 2 3 21 16 23 23 23 20 18
   1500-2000 13 1 5 14 24 36 15
       2000+ 1 2
Column Total    100%    100%    100%    100%    100%    100%    100%    100%    100%    100%
Percent of
  Observations
       5% 5 5 6 6 100      31% 18 14 11 8 10042
Table 7
Baseline Measures of Distributions of Own Social Security Benefits and Taxes for All Age Eligible Respondents
Annualized Individual AIME Deciles
Annualized AIME Range* $ 0-0.2K 0.2-4 4-7 7-11 11-16 16-21 21-26 26-31 31-38 38+ All
Average Lifetime Taxes* $ 0K 8 21 38 57 79 105 131 156 186 78
Average Lifetime Benefits*  0 16 37 48 59 72 86 97 106 113 63
Measures of Redistribution:
   Gini Coefficient - 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.19
   Share of Benefits
      Redistributed Within
      the Decile
-
   12.2% 12.0 10.8 11.1 10.5 9.5 6.9 5.9 4.7 14.1
   Share of Benefits
      Redistributed From
      Other Deciles
-
   57.2% 53.0 37.0 21.6 11.3 1.4 -8.9 -18.9 -33.0 -
   Share of Total
       Redistribution Coming
       to the Decile
-2.3% 10.1 21.8 19.8 14.4 9.1 1.3 -9.7 -22.4 -42.0 -
Rate of Return Percentiles:
   90% 6.3 6.1 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.6 3.0 2.6 2.0 4.8
   75% 5.3 5.3 4.5 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.5 2.1 1.7 3.9
   50% 4.7 4.6 3.9 3.3 2.9 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.5 2.6
   25% 4.0 4.0 3.2 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.6
   10% 3.3 3.1 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.1 0.4
*In thousands of dollars.43
Table 8
Measures of Redistribution:








Own Benefits and Taxes
All Respondents    14% 0.19    2.6%
   Males 7 0.10 1.9
   Females 12 0.17 3.7
Plus Spouse and Survivor Benefits
All Respondents 11 0.15 3.0
   Males 8 0.11 2.6
   Females 11 0.16 3.7
Family Benefits and Taxes
All Respondents 10 0.14 3.1
   Males 7 0.10 2.7
   Females 8 0.12 3.544
Table 9
Share of Benefits Redistributed to Group by AIME Decile
(Figures Are the Percentage of Benefits Accruing to the Decile Which Have Been Redistributed from Other Deciles)
Annualized Individual AIME Deciles
Annualized AIME Range* $ 0-0.2 0.2-4 4-7 7-11 11-16 16-21 21-26 26-31 31-38 38+
Own Benefits and Taxes -    57% 53 37 22 11 1 -9 -19 -33
Including Spouse and Survivor Benefits - 51 47 30 14 5 -2 -6 -12 -19
Family Benefits and Taxes 26 23 18 11 3 -3 -9 -12 -16 -23
Annualized Family AIME Deciles
Annualized AIME Range* $ 0-3K 3-8 8-14 14-20 20-26 26-31 31-36 36-42 42-49 49+
Own Benefits and Taxes    33% 50 28 13 4 -4 -10 -13 -15 -8
Including Spouse and Survivor Benefits 25 44 22 9 2 -1 -4 -7 -10 -12
Family Benefits and Taxes 30 23 13 3 -2 -2 -4 -7 -10 -16
*In thousands of dollars.45
Table 10
Share of Benefits Redistributed to Group by Earnings Decile
(Figures Are the Percentage of Benefits Accruing to the Decile Which Have Been Redistributed from Other Deciles)
Individual Significant Annual Earnings Deciles*
$ 0-6K 6-10 10-14 14-17 17-21 21-26 26-31 31-37 37-48 48+
Own Benefits and Taxes    53% 50 38 25 13 3 -7 -15 -21 -21
Including Spouse and Survivor Benefits 46 43 30 18 7 1 -6 -11 -14 -9
Family Benefits and Taxes 28 20 14 6 1 -5 -11 -15 -16 -14
Combined Significant Annual Earnings Deciles*
$ 0-13K 13-21 21-29 29-35 35-41 41-46 46-53 53-62 62-79 79+
Own Benefits and Taxes    43% 20 2 -3 -5 -5 -5 -3 -4 -6
Including Spouse and Survivor Benefits 36 14 2 -1 0 -2 -4 -4 -6 -4
Family Benefits and Taxes 21 7 3 1 2 -2 -3 -4 -7 -5
*Significant earnings are indexed yearly earnings that amount to at least 25 percent of the average of the high five years of indexed earnings.46



































































































































































Social Security Rates of Return by AIME and Annual Earnings Deciles
25th-75th Percentile Ranges, with Medians Indicated